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Abstract
The SRM is an institutionally complex system in which it is unclear
which actor is to be held legally accountable. The reason for this complexity flows
from the fact that the exercise of powers is spread over a multitude of actors at different
levels. Within the SRM’s framework, we find both vertical and horizontal cooperative
links. In relation to the vertical links, EU actors take the main decisions, while the
implementation is left to national actors. Horizontal cooperative links at the EU level
are also present as EU institutions and an EU agency have to act together in composite
administrative procedures. This institutional set-up results in unclarity as to where
responsibility lies. If legal protection is to be provided against decisions resolving sig-
nificant banks, it has to be clear who should be held responsible in legal review proce-
dures. The article’s aim is to examine what issues of legal review exist and to analyse
where the de facto decision-making, and thus legal responsibility, lies within the SRM’s
framework.
Introduction
The Single Resolution Mechanism (‘SRM’) is a textbook ex-
ample of a composite decision-making procedure since the relevant decision-
making powers are spread over a multitude of actors at different levels (EU,
intra-EU and national).
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The article will show that the SRM’s architecture and its implementation is
highly complex1 and that its division of powers is multi-layered. This might
result in challenges for upholding the principle of effective judicial protection
as guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union. Indeed, trying to find out which actor is to be held accountable
within the system has quite some resemblance to Hasbro’s well-known guessing
game ‘Guess who’. This raises the question as to how accountability, understood
in terms of legal review, is organised within the SRM. This article contributes
to existing literature by identifying gaps in the current legal review procedures
by relying on a case study of the Banco Popular2 cases currently pending at the
General Court.
This article consists of three sections; the first section will outline the main
features of the complex institutional framework and will show that it is unclear
where responsibility lies. The second section will disclose the gaps present in
the legal review procedures, and the concluding section will put forward the
main argument that it is the Single Resolution Board (‘SRB’) that should be
held responsible in legal review procedures in which the CJEU should assess
the legality of a resolution decision taken by the SRB (with the involvement of
the Commission and/or Council).3 The article will limit itself to the system of
the SRM and the procedure in which a significant bank is resolved by the SRB4
but will not discuss the resolution of a less significant bank at national level.5
Lastly, the scope of this article is limited to identifying issues of legal review
only, and not of accountability as a whole.
Danny Busch, ‘Governance of the Single Resolution Mechanism’, in Danny Busch & Guido
Ferrarini (ed.), European Banking Union (Oxford: OUP 2015) 332. European Court of Auditors,
1
Special Report No 23/2017, Single Resolution Board: Work on a challenging Banking Union
task started, but still a long way to go.
Banco Popular was the first significant bank to be resolved by SRB within the newly established
SRM framework. For an overview of all cases you can consult, https://ebi-europa.eu/publica-
tions/eu-cases-or-jurisprudence/, accessed 1 May 2019.
2
The Banco Popular cases pending before the General Court are an example of such a case.3
In essence the procedure of Article 18 SRMR.4
Which is done by the NRAs under the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive 2014/59/EU
(‘BRRD’). For more information on this type of resolution see: P.E. Berger & D. Vanderstraeten,
5
‘The Single Resolution Mechanism. Institutional and Financing Arrangements for Bank
Resolution in the European Banking Union’, in Robby Houben & Werner Vandenbruwaene
(ed.), The Single Resolution Mechanism (Cambridge: Intersentia 2017) 19-23.
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1. The Institutional Framework of the Single Reso-
lution Mechanism
As mentioned supra, the overarching problem within the SRM
is that the exercise of powers is spread over a multitude of actors at different
levels. In order to fully grasp this issue, the article will explain why the SRM
was created and will then give an overview of how the SRM system functions
when a significant bank is resolved. This section will subsequently clarify the
vertical and horizontal exercise of powers between the many actors involved.
Finally, attention will be drawn to the governance structure’s several layers of
complexity.6
1.1. Background to the SRM
The SRM is part of the European Banking Union. The creation
of the Banking Union was triggered by the financial and euro-crises. During
the crises, it became clear that the then existing system of banking supervision
and crisis management was not the best solution to deal with failing Eurozone
banks. Among the problems that were difficult to address, were inter alia the
interdependency of EU banks and the link between the sovereign and banks
(i.e. the so-called ‘doom loop’). The national systems of cooperation and coordi-
nation were not apt to deal with the failing large cross-border banks. As a
solution to this problem, the European Council in 20127 decided to establish a
system where both the supervision and the resolution of banks would be cent-
ralised and dealt with at the Union level.8 The supervision and resolution of
banks was therefore put within the broader objective of a ‘European Banking
Union’.9 The Banking Union consists of three pillars of which only the Single
Supervisory Mechanism10 (‘SSM’) and the SRM11 are already functioning. There
is no agreement yet between the European Parliament and the Council concern-
ing the third pillar, i.e. the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (‘EDIS’). Since
2014, the European Central Bank (‘ECB’) has taken on its task as a supervisor
Danny Busch, ‘Governance of the Single Resolution Mechanism’, in Danny Busch & Guido
Ferrarini (ed.), European Banking Union (Oxford: OUP 2015) 332.
6
European Council, The President, ‘TOWARDS A GENUINE ECONOMIC AND MONETARY
UNION. Report by President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy’, EUCO 120/12,
4.
7
The SRM is therefore an example of Europeanisation of banking resolution.8
Giuseppe Boccuzzi, ‘The Second Pillar of the Banking Union: From the NRAs to the Single
Resolution Mechanism’, in Giuseppe Boccuzzi, The European Banking Union Supervision and
Resolution (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2016) 116.
9
In place since 2014.10
In place since 2016.11
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of now 114 significant banks within the Eurozone.12 All other, so-called ‘less
significant’ banks continue to be supervised at the national level.13 As the SRM
is a necessary complement to the SSM, both should be viewed together.14 Against
this background of the Banking Union, the EU also made a division regarding
the resolution of banks. The 114 significant banks will be, if needed, resolved at
the EU level under the SRMR.15 When the ECB (or the SRB) determines that
one of the significant banks is failing or is likely to fail, the SRB will take up its
role as the central institution for bank resolution in the Eurozone. The purpose
of the SRM is to ensure an orderly resolution of failing banks with minimal
costs for taxpayers and the economy.16
When resolution happens at EU level, the content of the resolution measures
are taken by EU actors and only the implementation is done by the NRAs. This
already indicates how the exercise of powers is spread vertically (EU versus
national level) over a multitude of actors. This article will only focus on the
procedure which entails the resolution of a significant bank under Article 18 of
the SRM Regulation17 (‘SRMR’) and the exercise of powers between all actors
involved. This procedure has been used by the SRB and the EU institutions in
order to address the problems encountered by Banco Popular.18 What adds a
further layer of complexity is that at the EU level, the exercise is spread horizon-
tally between several EU actors. It is the agency, the SRB, which has the overall
responsibility for the effective and consistent functioning of the SRM.19
1.2. The SRB’s Institutional Set-up
For the analysis on the exercise of powers, it is important to
have a quick look at the SRB’s internal structure. The SRB is composed of a
European Central Bank, ‘List of Supervised Entities’, July 2019, https://www.bankingsupervi-
sion.europa.eu/banking/list/who/html/index.en.html.
12
Danny Busch, ‘Governance of the Single Resolution Mechanism’, in Danny Busch & Guido
Ferrarini, European Banking Union (Oxford: OUP 2015) 282-283.
13
Ibid, 283-284.14
While, the less significant banks will be resolved at national level under the Bank Recovery
and Resolution Directive 2014/59/EU. When resolution happens at national level, the NRAs
remain the sole responsible authority.
15
See European Commission, European Financial Stability and Integration Review (EFSIR),
SWD (2017) 171 final, PART 2/2, 82.
16
Regulation (EU) 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 es-
tablishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and
17
certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single
Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) 1093/2010 (‘SRMR’).
Single Resolution Board, SRB/EES/2017/08, 7 June 2017.18
SRMR (n. 16) art 7(1). The SRB is also responsible for drawing up resolution plans and adopting
all decisions relating to resolution for the entities or groups covered by the SRM, see SRMR
(n. 16) art 7(2).
19
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plenary session, an executive session, a Chair20 (and Vice-Chair21), a secretariat
and an Appeal Panel.22 The plenary session brings together the Chair, four full-
time members and one national representative from each NRA.23 Each of these
members has one vote.24 The plenary session decides upon the SRB’s internal
matters (i.a. annual work programme, annual budget, rules of procedure, etc.)
and upon the use of the Single Resolution Fund (SRF).25 The SRB’s executive
session is composed of the Chair and the four full-time members.26 The exec-
utive sessions prepare the decisions to be adopted by the plenary session and
take all decisions in order to implement the SRMR.27 Both the Commission
and the ECB are entitled to a permanent observer in both the plenary and the
executive sessions. This observer is entitled to participate in the meetings, de-
bates and shall have access to all documents.28 The observers, however, do not
have voting rights. The SRMR also sets up a Board of Appeal, named the Appeal
Panel.29 Its task is to offer to parties affected by certain types of SRB decisions
a first layer of legal review prior to a possible appeal before the CJEU.30 The
Appeal Panel is composed of five effective members and two alternates.31 Al-
though Article 43 SRMR does not list the Appeal Panel as one of the bodies of
the SRB, it is not a body external to the SRB either. In line with established
jurisprudence of the Courts on the position of the Boards of Appeal of others
agencies there arguably exists a functional continuity between the SRB and its
Appeal Panel.32
SRMR, art 56.20
SRMR, art 56(3).21
SRMR, art 43.22
SRMR, art 43(1).23
SRMR, art 43(2).24
SRMR, art 49.25
SRMR, art 53(1).26
SRMR, art 54(1). For a more detailed discussion, see Robby Houben and Werner Vanden-
bruwaene (ed.), The Single Resolution Mechanism (Cambridge: Intersentia 2017) 15-19.
27
SRMR, art 43(3).28
While there is no clear consensus on this point, it would go beyond the scope of this article to
discuss the nature of the Appeal Panel, but see Yves Herinckx, ‘Judicial Protection in the Single
29
Reso-lution Mechanism’, in Robby Houben & Werner Vandenbruwaene (ed.), The Single
Resolution Mechanism (Cambridge: Intersentia 2017), from recital 20 onwards; Dominik
Skauradszun, ‘Legal Protection against Decisions of the Single Resolution Board pursuant to
Article 85 Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation’ (2018) European Company and Financial
Law Review 3. The General Court defines Boards of Appeal in general as ‘quasi-juridictional
bodies’ in
Case T-133/08 Schräder v CPVO – Hansson EU:T:2012:430, para 137, 190.
SRMR, art 85. Yves Herinckx, ‘Judicial Protection in the Single Resolution Mechanism’, in
Robby Houben & Werner Vandenbruwaene (ed.), The Single Resolution Mechanism (Cambridge:
Intersentia 2017), recital 3.
30
SRMR, art 85(2).31
See e.g. Case T-163/98 Procter & Gamble v OHIM EU:T:1999:145, para 38 and Case T-102/13
Heli-Flight v EASA EU:T:2014:1064, para 27. M. Chamon, ‘Les agences décentralisées et le
32
droit procédural de l’UE’ (2016) Cahiers de droit europeen 52(2), 555-556. Yves Herinckx, ‘Judicial
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1.3. Horizontal Exercise of Powers Between the EU Institutions
and the SRB
When it is established that a significant bank is ‘failing or is
likely to fail’,33 the SRB is competent to find an appropriate solution.34 If reso-
lution needs to happen in the public interest then the adoption of a resolution
scheme will be necessary. It is the SRB who will draft the resolution scheme.35
In this case, the SRB adopts the resolution scheme in its executive session in-
cluding the representatives of the relevant NRAs.36 The idea is to reach a joint
agreement by consensus.37 The SRB, moreover, decides on the use of the reso-
lution tools and possible reliance on the SRF.38 Four tools are at the SRB’s dis-
posal, these are: the sale of business tool,39 the bridge institution tool, the asset
separation tool and the bail-in tool.40 When the SRB adopts the resolution
scheme, immediately after the adoption, the scheme must be transmitted by
the SRB to the Commission. When it has been transmitted, the Commission
has 24 hours to either (tacitly) endorse or object to the resolution scheme.
Furthermore, the Council is involved if within 12 hours from the transmission
of the scheme, the Commission proposes to object or to approve the resolution
scheme. If the Council then objects to the placing under resolution of an insti-
tution, the relevant institution will be wound down in accordance with the ap-
plicable national law. In the event that the Commission objects or the Council
Protection in the Single Resolution Mechanism’, in Robby Houben & Werner Vandenbruwaene
(ed.), The Single Resolution Mechanism (Cambridge: Intersentia 2017), recital 5.
Either by the ECB or by the SRB itself. It is important to note that the SRB itself can make the
assessment that a bank is failing or is likely to fail. Depending on your reading, the ECB’s
33
implied consent is still necessary to assess whether or not a bank is failing or is likely to fail
and as a consequence start resolution, as the ECB could still decide to make up its own assess-
ment. The consequence being that the SRB cannot make its own assessment. SRMR, art 18(1).
According to the General Court, the ECB’s assessment of the failing or likely to fail condition
is not binding on the SRB however, see Order in Case T-281/18 ABLV Bank AS v ECB
EU:T:2019:296, para 34.
Please note that the analysis in this article is based on the adoption of a resolution scheme
under the ‘normal’ decision-making procedure (i.e. no use is made of the Single Resolution
Fund).
34
The Commission can only endorse or object to the resolution scheme. It cannot propose
amendments.
35
SRMR, art 55.36
If this would not be feasible the Chair and the four full-time SRB members shall take a decision
by simple majority. This means that the national members appointed by the Member States
do not have voting rights when consensus cannot be reached.
37
See Article 18(6) b in conjunction with Article 22(2) SRMR.38
In the currently challenged Banco Popular resolution before the General Court, use had been
made of the ‘sale of business tool’. It would go beyond the scope of this contribution to go into
39
the specificities of all four tools but see Articles 25 to 27 of the SRMR (n. 16) and Michael
Schillig, ‘The EU resolution toolbox’, in Matthias Haentjens & Bob Wessels (ed.), Research
Handbook on Crisis Management in the Banking Sector (Edward Elgar Publishing 2015) 81-102.
More information on the tools can be found in Articles 25 to 27 of the SRMR.40
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has approved the Commission’s proposal for modification, the SRB shall
within eight hours modify the resolution scheme.41 At most, the procedure
could take up 32 hours (24 hours to endorse/object plus eight hours if the SRB
has to modify the scheme in response to the Commission’s or Council’s objec-
tions). This short timeframe makes it possible to adopt a resolution scheme
over the weekend, in order not to disturb the financial markets. It is clear that
the timing for the Commission and the Council to react and to exercise their
power of endorsement is short. However, for the Commission this should pose
less of a problem as in practice the Commission participates as an observer in
the SRB meetings.42 If the Commission were to remain silent, a literal reading
of Article 18(7) fifth paragraph, SRMR suggests that the scheme would enter
into force automatically. This would have immediate effects for judicial protec-
tion as the SRB decision will directly generate legal effects for third parties
without a formal endorsement decision from the Commission.
The reason why the two EU institutions (i.e. Commission and Council) have
been given these powers can be found in the Court’s infamous Meroni-doctrine.43
This doctrine limits the delegation of powers to agencies.44 In essence, this
doctrine led the SRMR drafters to believe that the input of the EU institutions
was needed only so as not to breach the CJEU’s doctrine. This makes clear why
in the SRM there is a distinction between the de facto actor (i.e. the SRB) and
the de jure actor(s) (i.e. Commission and Council) within the SRM.
SRMR, art 18(17), 18(8).41
Recital 26 of the SRMR gives more guidance on the observer status of the Commission: ‘As
an observer to the meetings of the Board, the Commission should, on an ongoing basis, check
42
that the resolution scheme adopted by the Board complies fully with this Regulation, balances
appropriately the different objectives and interests at stake, respects the public interest and
that the integrity of the internal market is preserved. Considering that the resolution action
requires a very speedy decision-making process, the Council and the Commission should co-
operate closely and the Council should not duplicate the preparatory work already undertaken
by the Commission.’
SRMR (n. 16), recital 26. Just before the SRMR was adopted, the Court in Short-selling refined
the Meroni-doctrine by only allowing delegations to agencies insofar as the agency (i) acts on
43
predefined criteria, (ii) cannot take autonomous decisions and (iii) is only exceptionally em-
powered. For a discussion of this case see, Mira Scholten & Marloes van Rijsbergen, ‘The
ESMA-Short Selling Case: Erecting a New Delegation Doctrine in the EU upon the Meroni-
Romano Remnants’ (2014) Legal Issues of Economic Integration 41(4), 389-405; Mira Scholten
& Marloes van Rijsbergen, ‘Limits of agencification in the european union’ (2014) German Law
Journal 15(7), 1223-1256; Cristoph Ohler, ‘Zur Übertragung von Rechtsetzungsbefugnissen auf
die Europäische Wertpapier- und Marktaufsichtsbehörde (ESMA)’ (2014) Juristenzeitung 249-
252; Simon Denys, ‘Délégation de compétences à l’Autorité européenne des marchés financiers’
(2014) Mars Comm. 3, 14-15; Laura Clément-Wilz, ‘Les agences de l’Union européenne dans
l’entre-deux constitutionnel’ (2015) Revue trimestrielle de droit européen 337-348.
It would go beyond the scope of this article to go into the Meroni-doctrine and the application
thereof within the SRM.
44
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1.4. Vertical Division of Powers Between the SRB and NRAs
The SRB, being the operational and decision-making body, is
responsible for the effective and consistent functioning of the SRM.45 When a
resolution scheme has been adopted by the EU actors, the implementation of
the scheme is left to the NRAs. The resolution scheme is addressed to them
and the NRAs must take all necessary measures to implement it.46 The SRB
closely monitors the execution of the resolution decision by the NRAs. The
NRAs, moreover, are under a duty to cooperate with the SRB.47 The NRAs exer-
cise their resolution powers in accordance with Article 29 SRMR.48 This Article
deals with the implementation of decisions taken under the SRMR. It states
that the NRAs shall exercise their powers under the national law transposing
the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive 2014/59/EU (‘BRRD’). They are
therefore obliged to fully inform the SRB of the exercise of their powers; Any
action the NRAs take must comply with the SRB’s decision.49 This makes clear
that a NRA has no or a very limited margin of discretion when implementing
the resolution scheme and the relationship between the SRB and the NRA’s is
very hierarchical.50 In the event, that a NRA has not applied or has not complied
with a SRB decision, the SRB can take over and may directly oblige the institu-
tion under resolution to undertake certain actions. Before the SRB takes over
it has to inform the Commission and the NRA of the measure it intends to
take.51 When the execution of the resolution scheme has been finalised, the
NRAs must submit a final report on the execution to the SRB.52
1.5. Conclusion on the Balance of Powers within the SRM
Within the SRM’s institutional framework, the SRB and the
European Commission (being EU actors) take the main decisions in the com-
posite procedure of Article 18 SRMR, while the responsibility for the implemen-
tation is left to the NRAs. This clearly proves the existence of vertical cooperative
links. On the other hand, at the Union level EU institutions and EU agencies
have to act together in the same procedure showing us the horizontal cooperative
SRMR, art 7(1).45
SRMR, art 18(19).46
SRMR, art 28(1).47
SRMR, art 18(9).48
SRMR, art 29(1).49
Before the SRM was contemplated, De Moor-van Vugt in general terms described how a process
of Europeanisation (altering the roles of national authorities and turning them into ‘subcon-
50
tractors’) would play out. See Adrienne de Moor-van Vugt, ‘Netwerken en de europeanisering
van het toezicht’ (2011) Tijdschrift voor Europees en economisch recht 59(3), 94-102.
SRMR, art 29(2).51
Article 28(1) in fine, SRMR.52
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links. The SRB takes de facto decisions which are formally endorsed by the
Commission (or the Council). This means that either the Commission or the
Council will be the de jure author of the decision. This is indeed a delicate balance
with a complex decision-making mechanism involving mainly the SRB, the
Commission and the Council.53 As stated by Busch, the SRM’s governance
structure features not one but several layers of complexity.54 This complexity
can be found in the division of tasks both vertically and horizontally. The SRM’s
decision-making process requires the intervention of many parties within a
very limited timeframe.55 As a consequence of this institutional set-up, the attri-
bution of wrongful decision-making under the SRM is unclear for the fora re-
viewing the resolution decision(s) brought before them.
2. Legal Review
This section will provide a succinct overview of the several
avenues for legal review in which the SRMR foresees. Additionally, this section
will lay bare gaps in legal review which exist within the SRM’s system.
Throughout the analysis referral will be made to the current Banco Popular
cases currently pending at the General Court, so as to make the link between
the theory in the SRMR and the practice.
2.1. Types of Legal Review within the Single Resolution
Mechanism
The article identifies two types of legal review within the SRM,
being administrative and judicial review. The reality of legal review within the
SRM is complex.56 The recitals of the SRMR provide us with an outline of how
decisions can be legally reviewed:
‘The SRM brings together the Board, the Council, the Commission and the
resolution authorities of the participating Member States. The Court of Justice
Giuseppe Boccuzzi, ‘The Second Pillar of the Banking Union: From the NRAs to the Single
Resolution Mechanism’, in Giuseppe Boccuzzi (ed.), The European Banking Union Supervision
and Resolution (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2016) 120.
53
Danny Busch, ‘Governance of the Single Resolution Mechanism’, in Danny Busch & Guido
Ferrarini (ed.), European Banking Union (Oxford: OUP 2015) 332.
54
Rudi Bonte, ‘Concluding Remarks on Resolution and Resolvability Challenges’, in Robby
Houben & Werner Vandenbruwaene (ed.), The Single Resolution Mechanism (Cambridge: In-
tersentia 2017) 137.
55
Dominik Skauradszun, ‘Legal Protection against Decisions of the Single Resolution Board
pursuant to Article 85 Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation’ (2018) European Company
and Financial Law Review 123, 1.
56
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has jurisdiction to review the legality of decisions adopted by the Board, the
Council and the Commission, in accordance with Article 263 TFEU, as well as
for determining their non-contractual liability. Furthermore, the Court of Justice
has, in accordance with Article 267 TFEU, competence to give preliminary
rulings upon request of national judicial authorities on the validity and inter-
pretation of acts of the institutions, bodies or agencies of the Union. National
judicial authorities should be competent, in accordance with their national law,
to review the legality of decisions adopted by the resolution authorities of the
participating Member States in the exercise of the powers conferred on them
by this Regulation, as well as to determine their non-contractual liability.’57
This outline seems at first sight to be rather straightforward, but as we will
see throughout the article, the reality is more complex.
2.1.1. Administrative Review
The Administrative board of review within the SRM is called
the ‘Appeal Panel’. It is the first form of legal review provided for private parties
who are affected by the SRB’s decision. This review is easier, faster and cheaper
compared to review before the EU courts. The members of the Appeal Panel
are legal scholars, lawyers and economists which has as its consequence that
the Appeal Panel is very well equipped to assess the complex, technical and
economic assessments the SRB has made within the SRM framework. The
SRMR itself does not mention on what grounds the Appeal Panel can review
decisions. Herinckx and Morais submit that the Appeal Panel will assess the
legality of the decision but it will not assess whether it was appropriate or op-
portune to take the decision.58 According to Herinckx, the applicable standard
of review by the Appeal Panel is that of ‘error of assessment’. It however, does
not need to be manifest as the Appeal Panel is well equipped to investigate
thoroughly whether or not the economic assessment made by the SRB was er-
roneous.59 Some legal scholars believe it is unclear60 whether only the legality
of the measure can be challenged or whether the Appeal Panel can also review
SRMR, recital 120.57
Luis Silva Morais, at Banca d’Italia and EBI Conference, ‘Judicial review in the Banking Union
and in the EU Financial Architecture’, Rome, 21 November 2017. Yves Herinckx, ‘Judicial
58
Protection in the Single Resolution Mechanism’, in Robby Houben & Werner Vandenbruwaene
(ed.), The Single Resolution Mechanism (Cambridge: Intersentia 2017), recital 24.
Yves Herinckx, ‘Judicial Protection in the Single Resolution Mechanism’, in Robby Houben
& Werner Vandenbruwaene (ed.), The Single Resolution Mechanism (Cambridge: Intersentia
2017), recital 26.
59
Luigi Lonardo, ‘The Banking Union: Agencies and the Lesson from the US’ (Birmingham Law
School Institute for European Law Working Paper Series) [2016/07], 8. Lonardo explains this
is unclear as the SRMR does not mention on what grounds the AP can review the decisions.
60
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procedural and technical aspects as well as look into the merits of the contested
decision.61 Claimants are obliged to first bring an appeal before the Appeal
Panel, if the decision falls within the scope of Article 85(3) SRMR. If the claim
does not fall within the Article’s scope, the claimant needs to initiate a procedure
before the EU courts. The Appeal Panel thus has no general appellate jurisdiction
over all SRB decisions.62 In combination with the strict admissibility criteria63
which mirror Article 263 TFEU, many cases have been declared inadmissible
before the Appeal Panel.64 Indeed Herinckx, who has acted as Vice-Chair of
the Appeal Panel, notes that the case law of the CJEU is taken into account in
order to decide upon the locus standi of the appellant.65 If and when a case is
admissible and the Appeal Panel decides on a case, its decision is binding for
the SRB. The Appeal Panel thus acts independently from the SRB.66 The Appeal
Panel can only confirm the SRB decision or remit the case to the SRB. It itself
cannot amend the SRB decision or take a decision replacing the SRB decision.67
The time limit to initiate proceedings is six weeks but the Appeal Panel itself
is also subject to strict limits as it has to decide on appeals within one month.68
The Appeal Panel’s decision is furthermore subject to an action for annulment
before the General Court. If such an appeal would indeed be lodged before the
General Court, it will only exercise limited review. It will assess whether there
was respect for procedural rules, whether the facts were correctly assessed and
whether the decision was vitiated by a manifest error of assessment. The Gen-
eral Court will therefore not assess whether or not the technical or economic
assessment was correctly decided.
2.1.2. Judicial Review at EU Level
Cases can come before the EU courts in four ways: as an ap-
peal against a decision of the Appeal Panel, action for annulment against an
SRB decision, action for damages or as a preliminary reference from a national
Paola Chirulli and Luca De Lucia, ‘Specialised Adjudication in EU Administrative Law: the
Boards of Appeal of EU Agencies’ (2015) European Law Review 40(6), 832, 846. Chirulli and
De Lucia believe the applicants are able to challenge more than only the legality of the measure.
61
The list is to be found in Article 85(3) SRMR.62
Direct and individual concern and the six week time limit.63
SRMR, art 85(3). Dominik Skauradszun, ‘Legal Protection against Decisions of the Single
Resolution Board pursuant to Article 85 Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation’ (2018)
European Company and Financial Law Review 123, 3 (80,33 % in 2017).
64
Yves Herinckx, ‘Judicial Protection in the Single Resolution Mechanism’, in Robby Houben
& Werner Vandenbruwaene (ed.), The Single Resolution Mechanism (Cambridge: Intersentia
2017), recitals 14-23.
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SRMR, art 85(2), 85(5).66
SRMR, art 85(8).67
SRMR, art 85(4).68
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court. A succinct overview of each of these procedures will be given under the
following headings.
I. Appeals Against Decisions of the Appeal Panel
Article 86(1) SRMR provides that an Appeal Panel decision can be further
appealed before the Court of Justice (i.e. the General Court). A subsequent appeal
against the General Court’s decision can be made to the Court of Justice under
general EU law (i.e. Article 256(1) TFEU).69 It is important to note that when
the Appeal Panel has jurisdiction, the challenge must be brought before the
Appeal Panel before an appeal can come before the General Court.70 A further
question arises regarding which party can lodge an appeal before the General
Court; Article 86(1) SRMR provides no guidance on this question. It seems
logical that the party which lodged a proceeding before the Appeal Panel and
which lost its case there, will be able to lodge an appeal before the General
Court. The SRB will have been the defendant before the Appeal Panel and thus,
it too could lodge an appeal before the General Court. However, this is not en-
tirely clear as the SRB is bound by the Appeal Panel’s decision (see Article 85(8)
SRMR). The defendant before the General Court will be the SRB and not the
Appeal Panel as it is the SRB which has to implement the Appeal Panel’s de-
cision, meaning we would end up having a case SRB versus SRB before the
General Court. Herinckx argues71 that the SRB is allowed to challenge the Appeal
Panel’s decision as the standing criteria (mirroring Article 263 TFEU) are the
following: the contested act must be ‘addressed to that person or be of direct
and individual concern to them’.72 The decision of the Appeal Panel is addressed
to the SRB, which means the SRB would have locus standi before the General
Court. Herinckx further argues that from a policy perspective, the SRB ‘must
be in a position to submit possible error of judgment made by the Appeal
Panel to the review of a higher body’.73 This is another example of unclarity and
thus complexity within the SRM legislation.
Article 256(1) Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU) [2016] OJ C202/1 (hereafter: TFEU). However following the latest amendment of the
69
Court’s statute this has changed for decisions of the Boards of Appeal of EUIPO, CPVO, ECHA
and EASA. Following appeals before the General Court only an exceptional review by the Court
is possible, not an appeal. See Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2019/629 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 17 April 2019 amending Protocol No 3 on the Statute of the Court of
Justice of the European Union [2019] OJ L111/1.
SRMR, art 86(1).70
Yves Herinckx, ‘Judicial Protection in the Single Resolution Mechanism’, in Robby Houben
& Werner Vandenbruwaene (ed.), The Single Resolution Mechanism (Cambridge: Intersentia
2017), recital 29. Herinckx acted as Vice-Chair of the Appeal Panel.
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TFEU, art 263(4).72
Yves Herinckx, ‘Judicial Protection in the Single Resolution Mechanism’, in Robby Houben
& Werner Vandenbruwaene (ed.), The Single Resolution Mechanism (Cambridge: Intersentia
2017), recital 29.
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II. Actions for Annulment by Natural and Legal Persons Against SRB
Decisions
An action for annulment can only be initiated before the General Court if
the appellant would not have the possibility of introducing an appeal before the
Appeal Panel. The Banco Popular cases are an excellent example of this route.74
It is highly important for the appellant to verify whether or not his or her com-
plaint could fall within the scope of review of the Appeal Panel. If the appellant
makes a mistake, the time limit of two months (in which the action for annul-
ment has to be lodged) may by then already have elapsed. In order to avoid such
a scenario, the appellant could introduce parallel proceedings, before the Appeal
Panel and before the General Court. If the appeal is inadmissible before the
Appeal Panel, this will not affect the action for annulment before the General
Court. The most difficult hurdle to overcome for the appellant is proving his
or her locus standi. The locus standi is accepted in three scenario’s: when the
SRB decision is addressed to him; because he meets the direct and individual
test as interpreted by the Court in the Plaumann case,75 or because the contested
act is a regulatory measure that directly concerns him and does not require
implementing measures.
When applying the Court’s case law on Article 263(4) TFEU to the pending
Banco Popular cases,76 it first has to be established whether the contested act is
a measure of individual or general application. In the case of Banco Popular,
the SRB’s resolution decision was addressed to the Spanish NRA (FROB).77 If
the SRB’s decision is considered by the General Court to be a measure of indi-
vidual application, the applicants will have to argue that they are part of a closed
group.78 The shareholders and creditors of Banco Popular consist of a group of
Because the SRB decision was based on Article 18 SRMR which is not one of the grounds listed
in Article 85 SRMR and accordingly does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Appeal Panel.
74
Case 25/62 Plaumann & Co. v Commission of the European Economic Community EU:C:1963:17,
para 107.
75
In which the shareholders and creditors of Banco Popular challenge the SRB’s resolution de-
cision.
76
However, this does not necessarily mean that it is a measure of individual application. See
Joined Cases C-622/16 P to C-624/16 P Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori v European Com-
77
mission EU:C:2018:873, para 20-39. If it is not a measure of individual application, the applicant
will have to show it is challenging a regulatory act. See Case C-583/11 P Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami
and Others vParliament and Council EU:C:2013:625, para 58-61.
Koen Lenaerts, Ignance Maselis & Kathleen Gutman, EU Procedural Law (Oxford: OUP 2014)
324, recital 7.98. Case C-362/06 P Markku Sahlstedt and Others v Commission EU:C:2009:243,
78
para 30. However, Herinckx argues that shareholders and creditors of the institution concerned
should in most circumstances be regarded as ‘mere members of a class and should therefore
not have standing to file an action for annulment before the CJEU’. See Herinckx (n. 28),
recital 36.
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persons who were identifiable at the time of adoption of the resolution scheme.79
It is of course a different question whether they have an interest in bringing
proceedings separate from Banco Popular itself. In a recent order the General
Court accepted that persons that were shareholders of a bank at the time that
bank’s authorization was revoked were individually concerned by the decision
revoking the authorization since it effectively limited their rights as shareholders
to instruct the bank’s management bodies to take legal action.80 Assuming that
Banco Popular is no longer able to autonomously act in its own interest, it is
submitted that the General Court’s reasoning is equally applicable to the
shareholders of Banco Popular at the time of the sale of Banco Popular to Banco
Santander.
Regardless whether the act is of general (and therefore a regulatory act) or
individual application, the claimants will secondly, have to satisfy the direct
concern test.81 Most decisions from the SRB are addressed to the NRAs.82 It is
then the NRA’s duty to implement the SRB decision at national level. The direct
concern test will not be satisfied in the situation where the SRB decision leaves
a margin of discretion to the NRA.83 The Banco Popular cases show how the
competent NRA, the FROB, did not have a margin of discretion when it was
implementing the SRB decision. In addition to be of direct concern, the decision
must also be capable of directly producing an effect on the legal situation of the
appellants.84 For the shareholders, it is argued that the imposed sale of Banco
Popular affected both the substance and the extent of their rights as it took away
E.g. Case 11/82 SA Piraiki-Pitraiki and Others v Commission of the European Communities
EU:C:1985:18, para 31. Case C-152/88 Sofrimport SARL v Commission of the European Communities
EU:C:1990:259, para 11.
79
Order T-247/16 Trasta Komercbanka and Others v ECB EU:T:2017:623, para 62. We consider
that the position of the shareholders of Banco Popular is similar to the position of shareholders
80
of a bank which has been liquidated as a result of the withdrawal by the ECB of the bank’s au-
thorization for taking up the business of credit institutions. An appeal against this order is
pending before the Court at the moment of writing. Advocate-General Kokott considers that
an action could still have been brought by the bank itself, suggesting that the shareholders do
not have an interest in bringing proceedings. See Opinion of AG Kokott in Joined Cases
C-663/17 P, C-665/17 P and C-669/17 P Trasta Komercbanka and Others v ECB EU:C:2019:323,
para 128.
For the Court’s traditional test, see i.a. C-463/10 P and C-475/10 P Deutsche Post AG and Federal
Republic of Germany v European Commission EU:C:2011:656, para 66. See also Case 97/85
81
Deutsche Lebensmittelwerke v European Commission EU:C:1987:243, para 11. C-131/92 Thierry
Arnaud and others v Council of the European Communities EU:C:1993:200, para 8.
See Article 29(1) SRMR.82
Tomas M.C. Arons, ‘Judicial Protection of Supervised Credit Institutions in the European
Banking Union’, in Danny Busch & Guido Ferrarini, The European Banking Union (Oxford:
83
OUP 2015) 462, recital 13.62. And B.J. Drijber, ‘De Europese Bankenunie op weg naar
voltooiing: het gemeenschappelijk afwikkelingsmechanisme’ (2015) SEW 220, 230-231.
Koen Lenaerts, Ignace Maselis & Kathleen Gutman, EU Procedural Law (Oxford: OUP 2014)
319, recital 7.92.
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their right to receive dividends and their possibility of exercising their voting
rights or their rights to take part in the management of the company.85
The above analysis deals with shareholders of the financial institution.
However, it could well be that the financial institution itself also wants to chal-
lenge the SRB’s decision. Nonetheless it is not obvious whether the bank itself
can, in reality, still pursue legal remedies as Banco Santander gained sole control
over Banco Popular as of the date on which the resolution decision was taken.
In the hypothesis that Banco Popular can no longer initiate an action for annul-
ment against the SRB decision, it is even more pivotal that the General Court
accepts the shareholders’ and creditors’ locus standi in light of the principle of
effective judicial protection. Whether this is possible depends on whether or
not the NRA had a margin of discretion when implementing a decision. If it
had, the decision is shielded from review as it does not satisfy the direct concern
test. This means that only the national implementation measures can be chal-
lenged before national courts. This outcome is evidently not satisfactory as the
real author of the decision is not NRA, but is the SRB. When the court has to
decide which actor is responsible it should asses where the de facto final decision-
making power lies. It is submitted by the author that in this case this would
indeed be with the SRB.
Another remaining unclarity consists of the standard of review the General
Court will apply when assessing the legality of the resolution decision.86 If the
author of a contested act exercises a discretionary power, the General Court
might only declare the resolution decision invalid when it is vitiated by a
‘manifest error of assessment’, or when it is arbitrary or clearly unreasonable.87
Whether this type of judicial restraint is always desirable, for example when
fundamental rights88 are involved, can of course be questioned.
The SRB has a ‘technical discretion’,89 which means that it acts as an admin-
istrative body and that its discretion and limited judicial review is justified by
Similarly, see Order T-247/16 Fursin and Others v ECB EU:T:2017:623, para 66-69.85
Until the first judgments by the General Court on Banco Popular are available.86
Janneke Gerards, ‘Pluralism, Deference and the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine’ (2011)
European Law Journal 80, 80-120. Lenaerts, Maselis & Gutman (n. 83) 385, recital 7.180. In the
87
ECJ’s Tetra Laval judgment of 2005 for example, the Court stated: ‘Whilst the Court recognizes
that the Commission has a margin of discretion with regard to economic matters, that does
not mean that the Community Courts must refrain from reviewing the Commission’s inter-
pretation of information of an economic nature.’ Case C-12/03 P-DEP Tetra Laval BV v European
Commission EU:C:2005:87, para 39.
Such as the right to property for example.88
See by analogy Case C-40/03 P Rica Foods (Free Zone) NV v Commissionof the European Com-
munities EU:C:2005:93, Opinion of AG Léger, paras 45-46. Miro Prek & Silvere Lefèvre, ‘“Ad-
89
ministrative Discretion”, “Power Of Appraisal” And “Margin Of Appraisal” In Judicial Review
Proceedings Before The General Court’ (2019) Common Market Law Review 56(2), 339.
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the complexity of the economic, legal and political assessments the SRB has to
make. It might be suggested that the judges call in external expertise when
technical questions come before it,90 but in practice the Court makes very limited
use of this possibility. Specifically, for decisions taken under the SRMR, however,
it is put forward that calling in such external expertise is not necessary at all
since there is a specialised Appeal Panel. However, the biggest drawback to this
suggestion is that the Appeal Panel’s jurisdiction ratione materiae is very limited.
As demonstrated by the flood of annulment actions against Banco Popular’s
resolution, many SRB decisions cannot be reviewed by the Appeal Panel and
have to be challenged directly before the General Court.91
III. Action for Damages – Liability
In Article 87 SRMR (governing the liability of the SRB) we read that juris-
diction regarding non-contractual liability claims are granted to the CJEU.92
The liability of the SRB concerning non-contractual liability in essence mirrors
the general principle of non-contractual liability codified in Article 340(2) TFEU
regarding non-contractual liability of the Union. Article 87 SRMR also foresees
in a compensation for damages (i.e. an indemnity provision93) which is not re-
lated to unlawful conduct. If the wrongful conduct can be attributed to both the
SRB and the NRA, there may be joint liability of both. In this case the claim
should be split between the CJEU and the national court. In that case, the CJEU
might require that all national remedies are exhausted first.94 The action for
damages is different from all other direct actions as it is a compensatory action
aimed at making good the harmful consequences that an EU measure/conduct
or omission by an EU institution has on an applicant. All other direct actions
are aimed at obtaining a declaration from the Court that a Member State or an
EU institution has breached European Union law.95 Since the Bergaderm judg-
ment96 the CJEU has unified the three fundamental criteria for substantive
damages liability. These are in essence the following: (1) a rule of law granting
Case C-269/90 Technische Universität München v Hauptzollamt München-Mitte EU:C:1991:317,
Opinion of AG Jacobs, para 13.
90
SRMR, art 85(3).91
SRMR, art 87(1), (3) and (5).92
Yves Herinckx, ‘Judicial Protection in the Single Resolution Mechanism’, in Robby Houben
& Werner Vandenbruwaene (ed.), The Single Resolution Mechanism (Cambridge: Intersentia
2017), recital 43.
93
Ibid, recital 44.94
Albertina Albors-Llorens, ‘Judicial protection before the Court of Justice of the European Court’,
in Catherine Barnard & Steve Peers (ed.), European Union Law (Oxford: OUP 2017) 268.
95
Case C-352/98 P Laboratories Pharmaceutiques Bergaderm and Jean-Jacques Goupil v Commission
of the European Communities EU:C:2000:361, paras 41-42.
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rights to individuals,97 (2) this rule has been breached in a sufficiently serious
manner, and (3) there is a causal link between the damage and the action/inac-
tion by the EU or the Member State. An extensive discussion of this criteria
would go beyond the scope of this article, which is why only the potential legal
issues the claimants would encounter in an action for damages will be touched
upon. In order to be successful in showing a sufficiently serious breach, it is
decisive whether the EU body (e.g. the SRB) had a large or narrow discretion
when adopting the act in question. If it had a large margin of discretion, a suf-
ficiently serious breach is required. The SRB will have had a large discretion
in a resolution case as its decision is based upon complex technical and economic
assessments. The CJEU will take into account that the EU body often has to
make difficult discretionary choices. However, as stated above, there are judges
who will not be intimidated by complex, technical and economic questions and
will try to assess in depth whether the assessment made is affected by a
(manifest) error of assessment.98
IV. Preliminary References from National Courts
Under Article 267 TFEU, the CJEU is competent to hear preliminary refer-
ences from national courts on the interpretation and validity of acts with
European law. A reference from a national court can be send in a procedure
where a decision of the NRA is challenged or whether the national court has to
assess the non-contractual liability of the NRA. As discussed before, the NRAs
are competent to implement the SRB decisions and the margin of discretion
can vary from none to quite some discretion. When the NRA has a certain
margin of discretion, this can mean that the SRB decision cannot be challenged
before the General Court because the direct concern test is not satisfied. The
only way in which the original SRB decision can then be challenged is via the
indirect route of Article 267 TFEU. If the national court is of the opinion that
the SRB decision is valid, it will not refer a question to the CJEU. National
courts, according to the Fotofrost doctrine of the CJEU,99 are of course not en-
titled to declare an EU act invalid. Lastly, there can exist a duty to refer for a
national court when it is the court adjudicating in last instance and no further
judicial remedy is available.100
See also Tomas M.C. Arons, ‘Judicial Protection of Supervised Credit Institutions in the
European Banking Union’, in Danny Busch & Guido Ferrarini (ed.), The European Banking
Union (Oxford: OUP 2015) 470, recital 13.6.
97
See for example AG Jacobs’ view in his Opinion in Technische Universität München: ‘The Court
cannot shy away from technical questions and must in an appropriate case be prepared to resolve
such questions by commissioning an expert’s report under its rules of procedure.’ Case
98
C-269/90 Technische Universität München v Hauptzollamt München-Mitte EU:C:1991:317,
Opinion of AG Jacobs, para 13.
Case C-314/85 Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost EU:C:1987:452, paras 14-17.99
TFEU, art 267(3).100
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2.1.3. Judicial Review at National Level
National courts are competent to adjudicate on several de-
cisions made within the SRM framework. They are mainly competent to review
the legality of decisions adopted by the NRAs in the exercise of the powers
conferred on them by the SRMR and to determine the NRAs non-contractual
liability.101 As we have seen, firstly, they are competent to entertain a dialogue
with the CJEU by sending preliminary references either on the interpretation
or on the validity of EU acts. Secondly, they are allowed to approve ex-ante crisis
management measures taken by NRAs.102 Thirdly, they can entertain a challenge
against a valuation of assets and liabilities. A valuation of assets and liabilities103
plays an important role in the resolution of a bank. Usually, there are two
valuations: one before the resolution and one after the resolution. These are to
be carried out by an independent third person.104 The pre-resolution valuation
is an integral part of the SRB’s resolution decision. The SRMR foresees that
the pre-resolution valuation can only be subject to appeal together with the
SRB’s resolution decision.105 Some of the shareholders of Banco Popular have
indeed challenged the valuation decision together with the SRB decision before
the General Court.106 As stated by Herinckx, there is no mention of a right of
appeal against the ‘post-resolution valuation’ but some judicial review should
be available in light of the principle of effective judicial protection enshrined
in Article 47 CFR. The legal issue lies in the fact that the author of the valuation
is an independent third person, not the SRB nor the NRA. If a claim would be
brought before a national court, it might not be able to refer a question to the
CJEU as it is not an act of an EU organ.107 This is not a desirable situation in
light of effective judicial protection.
SRMR (n. 16), recital 120.101
The judicial approval of ex-ante crisis management measures will not be discussed in the article
as it deals with the system under the Bank Recovery and Reso-lution Directive 2014/59/EU
102
and is not foreseen in the SRMR. But see: Yves Herinckx, ‘Judicial Protection in the Single
Resolution Mechanism’, in Robby Houben & Werner Vandenbruwaene (ed.), The Single Reso-
lution Mechanism (Cambridge: Intersentia 2017), recital 49.
Or multiple valuations.103
SRMR (n. 16) art 20(1) and (16).104
SRMR (n. 16) art 20(15).105
By using the action for an annulment procedure under Article 263 TFEU.106
Yves Herinckx, ‘Judicial Protection in the Single Resolution Mechanism’, in Robby Houben
& Werner Vandenbruwaene (ed.), The Single Resolution Mechanism (Cambridge: Intersentia
2017) 45, recital 53.
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3. Conclusion
As the exercise of powers is spread over a multitude of actors
at different levels within the SRM’s framework, the existent regime of legal re-
view is equally complex. It is clear that in theory no measure within the SRM
is immune from review. Recital 120 of the SRMR sets out a clear division of
tasks between the EU courts and the national courts. It indeed refers to all tra-
ditional avenues of review, i.e. Articles 263, 267 and 340 TFEU. From a purely
theoretical point of view it can be argued that a ‘full regime of legal protection’
is present. However, it has also become clear that there are many limitations
to legal review and that theory does not necessarily align with the practice. The
complex division of powers within the SRM’s framework has been established
in the first section and has shown that it is unclear which actor should be held
legally accountable for the resolution decision. Thus, the question arises,
whether this is the de facto author, i.e. the SRB or the de jure author, the Com-
mission and/or the Council. It is the author’s view that the SRB is to be held
accountable in legal review procedures in which the CJEU should assess the
legality of a resolution decision taken by the SRB (with the involvement of the
Commission and/or Council), because essentially the real decision-making
power lies with the SRB. Another possible solution to address this issue can be
to hold the actors jointly accountable. In this article it has moreover been estab-
lished that the rules on standing for applicants are strict (i.e. individual and
direct concern test), that the EU Courts might show judicial restraint when as-
sessing the validity of a resolution decision, that it is not always clear which
party is able to initiate a proceeding and that applicants have to abide by a strict
time-limit of two months, which can lead to the introduction of parallel proceed-
ings and thus also diverging outcomes. In the Banco Popular cases, for example,
it is not set in stone that the shareholders even have a legal interest in bringing
a case. If the General Court would annul the SRB’s decision to sell Banco Pop-
ular to Banco Santander, it is entirely impossible to become shareholders of
Banco Popular again as it does not exist anymore. With regards the administra-
tive review by the Appeal Panel, it is positive that its members are very well
equipped to assess complex, technical and economic assessments. However,
its jurisdiction to review SRB decisions is fairly limited. A greater role for the
Appeal Panel would be a solution to the issue that the SRB decisions are tech-
nically too complex for judges to properly evaluate. In the author’s opinion it
is however still too early to provide an answer to the accusation whether this
complex system of EU governance, lacks legal accountability. It is true that
several issues of legal review can be identified, but it might be the case that the
Union courts will make sure that these gaps in legal protection are addressed
in its case law. Before the Banco Popular cases are decided, we can not provide
a definite answer as to whether such an accusation is indeed justified or not.
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